Source is here.
Wednesday, January 13, 2010
Poll Cats: Congressional Repubs hammered by 75%
For those who think that the Republicans are ascendant.....
The point is that not liking the Dems does NOT imply liking RINOs.
The Rasmussen poll. 75%? Wow.
(Nod to Angry Alex)
The point is that not liking the Dems does NOT imply liking RINOs.
The Rasmussen poll. 75%? Wow.
(Nod to Angry Alex)
Tuesday, January 12, 2010
Good Thing I'm Already Married!
'Letting fatties roam the site is a direct threat to our business model and the very concept for which BeautifulPeople.com was founded.'
No to fatties!
(Nod to Anonyman, who could stand to lose 5 pounds)
No to fatties!
(Nod to Anonyman, who could stand to lose 5 pounds)
Murdering the Data
These guys got in touch with their inner Grier. Turns out if you poke a fork at the wall around econometric studies of death penalty deterrence, then roaches come pouring out.
Estimating the Impact of the Death Penalty on Murder
John Donohue & Justin Wolfers, American Law and Economics Review, forthcoming
Abstract: This paper reviews the econometric issues in efforts to estimate the impact of the death penalty on murder, focusing on six recent studies published since 2003. We highlight the large number of choices that must be made when specifying the various panel data models that have been used to address this question. There is little clarity about the knowledge potential murderers have concerning the risk of execution: are they influenced by the passage of a death penalty statute, the number of executions in a state, the proportion of murders in a state that leads to an execution, and details about the limited types of murders that are potentially susceptible to a sentence of death? If an execution rate is a viable proxy, should it be calculated using the ratio of last year's executions to last year's murders, last year's executions to the murders a number of years earlier, or some other values? We illustrate how sensitive various estimates are to these choices. Importantly, the most up-to-date OLS panel data studies generate no evidence of a deterrent effect, while three 2SLS studies purport to find such evidence. The 2SLS studies, none of which shows results that are robust to clustering their standard errors, are unconvincing because they all use a problematic structure based on poorly measured and theoretically inappropriate pseudo-probabilities that are designed to capture the key deterrence elements of a state's death penalty regime, and because their instruments are of dubious validity. We also discuss the appropriateness of the implicit assumption of the 2SLS studies that OLS estimates of the impact of the death penalty would be biased against a finding of deterrence.
(Nod to Kevin L)
Estimating the Impact of the Death Penalty on Murder
John Donohue & Justin Wolfers, American Law and Economics Review, forthcoming
Abstract: This paper reviews the econometric issues in efforts to estimate the impact of the death penalty on murder, focusing on six recent studies published since 2003. We highlight the large number of choices that must be made when specifying the various panel data models that have been used to address this question. There is little clarity about the knowledge potential murderers have concerning the risk of execution: are they influenced by the passage of a death penalty statute, the number of executions in a state, the proportion of murders in a state that leads to an execution, and details about the limited types of murders that are potentially susceptible to a sentence of death? If an execution rate is a viable proxy, should it be calculated using the ratio of last year's executions to last year's murders, last year's executions to the murders a number of years earlier, or some other values? We illustrate how sensitive various estimates are to these choices. Importantly, the most up-to-date OLS panel data studies generate no evidence of a deterrent effect, while three 2SLS studies purport to find such evidence. The 2SLS studies, none of which shows results that are robust to clustering their standard errors, are unconvincing because they all use a problematic structure based on poorly measured and theoretically inappropriate pseudo-probabilities that are designed to capture the key deterrence elements of a state's death penalty regime, and because their instruments are of dubious validity. We also discuss the appropriateness of the implicit assumption of the 2SLS studies that OLS estimates of the impact of the death penalty would be biased against a finding of deterrence.
(Nod to Kevin L)
Europe: you guys know it's not a single country, right?
The latest debate in the blogosphere revolves around comparing the economic performance of the US relative to Europe. This is problematic, as people are not using a common metric or any real data analysis. Krugman has claimed that any superior US performance in growth is only due to increased population.
Lets take a look at some actual numbers, shall we? These are from the total economy database started by Angus Maddison, and taken over by Groningen University and the Conference Board. I am using the Table for GDP per capita in 1990 US$ (converted at Geary Khamis PPPs).
In 1980, where this debate seems to start, we can see that all the European countries I've chosen were considerably poorer than the US except for Switzerland.
Below I list Per Capita GDP as a % of US Per Capita GDP for selected European countries in 1980 and 2008:
Austria 74.06 76.72
Denmark 81.96 78.82
France 81.31 72.91
Greece 48.29 52.33
Ireland 45.97 90.70
Italy 70.78 63.70
Neth 79.15 78.83
Norway 81.15 93.01
Portugal 43.30 46.07
Spain 49.53 55.62
Sweden 80.40 78.81
Switz 101.0 79.56
UK 69.61 76.47
Germany 66.34 (2008 only)
As one can see, the European experience is quite varied. Greece, Portugal and Spain have done a little bit better than the US over the period but are still extremely poor in comparison at roughly half of US per capita GDP in 2008.
In 1980, where this debate seems to start, we can see that all the European countries I've chosen were considerably poorer than the US except for Switzerland.
Below I list Per Capita GDP as a % of US Per Capita GDP for selected European countries in 1980 and 2008:
Austria 74.06 76.72
Denmark 81.96 78.82
France 81.31 72.91
Greece 48.29 52.33
Ireland 45.97 90.70
Italy 70.78 63.70
Neth 79.15 78.83
Norway 81.15 93.01
Portugal 43.30 46.07
Spain 49.53 55.62
Sweden 80.40 78.81
Switz 101.0 79.56
UK 69.61 76.47
Germany 66.34 (2008 only)
As one can see, the European experience is quite varied. Greece, Portugal and Spain have done a little bit better than the US over the period but are still extremely poor in comparison at roughly half of US per capita GDP in 2008.
France and Italy have done notably worse than the US over the period and are at less than 75% of US per capita income.
Austria, Denmark, the Netherlands and Sweden have basically performed about the same as the US over the period and remain at roughly 80% of US per capita income.
Norway has done quite a bit better than the US over the period and is now above 90% of US per capita income. Ireland has done even better, going from around 50% of US income levels to 90% of the US over this period. The UK has also done better than the US in per capita growth but still has only reached about 3/4s of the US level of per-capita income.
Germany at re-unification (1989) was at 69% of US levels and has fallen to 66% by 2008.
So, it's very misleading to talk about growth or wealth levels in "Europe" as if one number captured the European experience. Italy and France appear to be from different worlds than Norway and Ireland!
It is also not correct that US growth has been higher only due to population growth. Many European countries, including large ones like France, Germany and Italy have seen their per-capita incomes fall relative to the US since 1980.
So, it's very misleading to talk about growth or wealth levels in "Europe" as if one number captured the European experience. Italy and France appear to be from different worlds than Norway and Ireland!
It is also not correct that US growth has been higher only due to population growth. Many European countries, including large ones like France, Germany and Italy have seen their per-capita incomes fall relative to the US since 1980.
And, while it is true that many European countries have had very similar per capita growth as the US since 1980, these countries generally are quite a bit poorer than the US by this metric at least and thus perhaps should not be too proud of only matching our growth rates (you know, convergence and all that).
I hate to bring up neoclassical growth theory, but in the steady state of that model, all countries should grow at the same rate (in per capita terms). Differences in institutions or policies only result in permanent differences in income levels in the standard model.
Finally, big ups to Ireland and Norway for their amazing economic performance over this 1980 - 2008 time period. Ireland I know, changed their economic institutions over this period, but I don't really know anything about Norway (well, they do have oil, right?)
Why No "Credit" for BHO?
My good friend, Jennifer Merolla, chair of Claremont Grad School's Politics and Policy Department, has a piece in the HuffinPuff Post. Interesting...
Throughout most of his presidency, public support for George W. Bush increased in conjunction with the terror threat level. Conventional wisdom tells us that the public rallies behind the sitting president when its national security is perceivably threatened. Yet, following the recent Christmas Day bombing attempt, approval ratings for President Barack Obama have remained fairly flat. Is this lukewarm response to our current president symptomatic of public apathy toward terrorism?
Throughout most of his presidency, public support for George W. Bush increased in conjunction with the terror threat level. Conventional wisdom tells us that the public rallies behind the sitting president when its national security is perceivably threatened. Yet, following the recent Christmas Day bombing attempt, approval ratings for President Barack Obama have remained fairly flat. Is this lukewarm response to our current president symptomatic of public apathy toward terrorism?
Hugo Cracks Down on Inflation
Hugo cracks down on inflation.....by beating up people who raise prices.
Very clever. He can bankrupt the middle class in six months.
WHY he would want to do that is hard to say. But it is an effective policy, if that is the goal.
Very clever. He can bankrupt the middle class in six months.
WHY he would want to do that is hard to say. But it is an effective policy, if that is the goal.
Monday, January 11, 2010
The Venezuelan devaluation
The Bolivar has been pegged at 2.15 to the dollar for about 5 years. Over those 5 years, Venezuelan inflation has ranged from 15 - 30 percent per year while US inflation ranged from 0 to 5 percent per year. That is to say, unless the Bolivar was massively overvalued when pegged in early 2005, it has become way overvalued. Yesterday, President Chavez ordered the devaluation of the Bolivar to 4.3 per dollar (2.6 per dollar for some specific imported goods).
Chavez did a pretty good job of explaining the Venezuelan situation as one of a country suffering from the Dutch disease. It heavily exports a primary commodity, which supposedly causes currency appreciation and hurts manufacturing. He emphasized that the country needed to overcome this problem and produce stuff, not just pump stuff out of the ground. Here is a relevant fragment from his TV show:
The devaluation is good policy for sure. I am not crazy about the tiers and controls, and opposition leaders in the country say Chavez will use the increased local currency revenues from oil exports to boost domestic spending in advance of elections, but it is the correct move for the country at this time (and should have been done much sooner). Fixing the nominal exchange rate to a country whose inflation rate you are unwilling to match is a recipe for economic disaster that we have seen cooked up over and over again in Latin America. Venezuela is getting out before the disaster hits, at least this time.
Sunday, January 10, 2010
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