Why I am on Facebook

Sure the cat vs. cucumber videos are awesome, but check out my Facebook feed this morning.

Epic and wonderful. Thanks Dan and Jason (and WW too!).

Framed! Philosophers are no better at this than the rest of us

Interesting that they found this result.  I guess I'm surprised, at least a little.  Although "Fiery Cushman" is an excellent name, I have to admit.

Philosophers’ biased judgments persist despite training, expertise and reflection 

Eric Schwitzgebel & Fiery Cushman
Cognition, August 2015, Pages 127–137

Abstract: We examined the effects of framing and order of presentation on professional philosophers’ judgments about a moral puzzle case (the “trolley problem”) and a version of the Tversky & Kahneman “Asian disease” scenario. Professional philosophers exhibited substantial framing effects and order effects, and were no less subject to such effects than was a comparison group of non-philosopher academic participants. Framing and order effects were not reduced by a forced delay during which participants were encouraged to consider “different variants of the scenario or different ways of describing the case”. Nor were framing and order effects lower among participants reporting familiarity with the trolley problem or with loss-aversion framing effects, nor among those reporting having had a stable opinion on the issues before participating in the experiment, nor among those reporting expertise on the very issues in question. Thus, for these scenario types, neither framing effects nor order effects appear to be reduced even by high levels of academic expertise.

Feliz Día de San Valentín

I got your headline right here (NSFC)*

Mungo's not the only one who appreciates a headline that make any subsequent text superfluous.

Check out this Humdinger!


*= not safe for church.

What's Right?

Exposure to Moral Relativism Compromises Moral Behavior 

Tage Rai & Keith Holyoak
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology,
November 2013, Pages 995–1001

Abstract: Across two studies we investigated the relationship between moral relativism versus absolutism and moral behavior. In Experiment 1, we found that participants who read a relativist argument for tolerating female genital mutilation were more likely to cheat to win an incentivized raffle than participants who read an absolutist argument against female genital mutilation, or those in a control condition. In Experiment 2, participants who read a definition of morality phrased in absolutist terms expressed less willingness to engage in petty theft than those who read a definition of morality phrased in relativist terms, or those in a control condition. Experiment 2 also provided evidence that effects were not due to absolutist arguments signaling that fewer behaviors are morally permissible, nor to relativist arguments defending more disagreeable moral positions. Rather, the content of the philosophical positions themselves — the fact that relativism describes morality as subjective and culturally-historically contingent, whereas absolutism describes morality as objective and universal — makes individuals more likely to engage in immoral behaviors when exposed to moral relativism compared to moral absolutism.
                                                      ***********

Moral Cleansing and Moral Licenses: Experimental Evidence

Pablo Brañas-Garza et al.

Economics and Philosophy, July 2013, Pages 199-212

Abstract: Research on moral cleansing and moral self-licensing has introduced dynamic considerations in the theory of moral behaviour. Past bad actions trigger negative feelings that make people more likely to engage in future moral behaviour to offset them. Symmetrically, past good deeds favour a positive self-perception that creates licensing effects, leading people to engage in behaviour that is less likely to be moral. In short, a deviation from a ‘normal state of being’ is balanced with a subsequent action that compensates the prior behaviour. We model the decision of an individual trying to reach the optimal level of moral self-worth over time and show that under certain conditions the optimal sequence of actions follows a regular pattern which combines good and bad actions. To explore this phenomenon we conduct an economic experiment where subjects play a sequence of giving decisions (dictator games). We find that donations in the previous period affect present decisions and the sign is negative: participants' behaviour in every round is negatively correlated to what they did in the past. Hence donations over time seem to be the result of a regular pattern of self-regulation: moral licensing (being selfish after altruistic) and cleansing (altruistic after selfish).

Nod to Kevin Lewis

What is the case for progressive taxation?

I am aware of two general arguments.

The first relies on inter-personal utility comparisons and goes like this: The marginal utility of a dollar is much higher for poor people than rich people, so in a utilitarian spirit, we can justify taking more marginal dollars away from the rich and giving them to lower income people.

Note that

(1) interpersonal utility comparisons are at best tricky and more likely impossible. We cannot rule out the case that the Sultan of Brunei gets more utility from another dollar than a slum dweller in Mumbai, and that in a utilitarian spirit, we should tax the slum dweller and give it to the Sultan!

(2) This is a case for redistribution, not for progressive taxes just to fund government generally.

(3) There is no reason for the argument to apply only inside national borders. Under the assumption of uniform diminishing marginal utility of money, we should be taxing poor Americans and giving it to the slum dwellers of Mumbai (or if we really have a utils machine, perhaps to the Sultan of Brunei).

The second argument is Rawlsian, and it goes like this: If we got together to set the rules of the game, without knowing what our socio-economic positions would be when the game was played (i.e. behind the veil of ignorance), we would all agree that rich people should be taxed at a higher rate and the money be redistributed to the poor.

Note that the same 3 notes above to argument #1 also apply equally here. We are taking uniform diminishing marginal utility of money as given, it's an argument for redistribution, not general funding, and, here even more than ever, it's a argument that should be applied globally.

Behind the veil, we don't know whether we'll be living in Norman Oklahoma, a slum in Mumbai or a palace in Brunei. The Rawlsian veil argues for higher taxes on most Americans with redistribution done on a global scale.

Now there's also the "you didn't build that" argument, but that seems more of a case that the rich should pay more taxes than the poor, which, certain extreme cases to the contrary notwithstanding, they generally do, and not a case for higher tax rates on the rich.

Are there other ways to make the case? Let me know in the comments