Electoral design and voter welfare from the US Senate: Evidence from a
dynamic selection model
Gautam Gowrisankaran, Matthew Mitchell & Andrea Moro
Review of Economic Dynamics, January 2008, Pages 1-17
Abstract:
Since 1914, the US Senate has been elected and incumbent senators allowed to
run for reelection without limit. This differs from several other elected
offices in the US, which impose term limits on incumbents. Term limits may
harm the electorate if tenure is beneficial or if they force high quality
candidates to retire but may also benefit the electorate if they cause
higher quality candidates to run. We investigate how changes in electoral
design affect voter utility by specifying and structurally estimating a
dynamic model of voter decisions. We find that tenure effects for the US
Senate are negative or small and that incumbents face weaker challengers
than candidates running for open seats. Because of this, term limits can
significantly increase voter welfare.
The welfare effects of term limits are more complex than this, for starters. But I'm not sure that this argument is right even on its own terms.
Showing posts sorted by relevance for query term limits. Sort by date Show all posts
Showing posts sorted by relevance for query term limits. Sort by date Show all posts
Wednesday, December 19, 2007
Friday, August 21, 2009
I Think This is a Problem
Chateau sends this link, to a story headlined:
Time for Term Limits? Let the Voters Decide!
I'm pretty sure there is a problem with that. Voters actually get to decide at the time of elections.
(Full disclosure: we have written about term limits before....And, we have noted the sort of person who opposes term limits, including Hugo Chavez)
Time for Term Limits? Let the Voters Decide!
I'm pretty sure there is a problem with that. Voters actually get to decide at the time of elections.
(Full disclosure: we have written about term limits before....And, we have noted the sort of person who opposes term limits, including Hugo Chavez)
Thursday, October 22, 2009
Register Independent?
We get letters....
Mr. Munger, Your comments and suggestions would be a great help. I have sent out hundreds of emails and wonder if I am beating a dead horse.
"One thing our founding fathers could not foresee…was a nation governed by professional politicians who had a vested interest in getting reelected. They probably envisioned a fellow serving a couple of hitches and then looking…forward to getting back to the farm.” —Ronald Reagan (1973)
WHY SHOULD YOU REGiSTER INDEPENDENT? short answer: because you can optimize your voting rights
Politicians now enjoy a lifetime job with regular raises and great benefits. The only way we can expect any changes in the economy is to un-elect them! Why not attack their biggest fears? All politicians fear 1. not being re-elected 2. term limits 3. tax revolts and 4. loss of power. The best way to break the Democratic (Dems) party and the Republican (Rep) party stranglehold is to register Independent (Indies). When you register Indie you do not need to change your political views, be they liberal or conservative. Being an Indie gives you more choices to vote for the most qualified person to handle the job. Why not vote for one Dem and one Rep Senator to balance out the Senate and level the playing field? Bi-partisan politics no longer works. It doesn't matter if the Dems have the majority or the Reps. The results are the same. Heads they win, tails we lose...
Ok, so what do we do after registering Indie? Write, call or email your Senators and Representives. Tell them you have registered Indie because you no longer trust the government machine. This may or may not "freak out" the politicians. Politicians keep a very close eye on the number of Dems, Reps or Indies in their district. If they see a huge number of NEW registered Indies, you can be sure we are weakening their stranglehold.
"Democracy is dead ... lobbyists rule America"---THIS IS A MUST READ, YOU WILL BE SHOCKED!
“Of all the reforms the freshmen wanted to bring to Washington, I believed setting term limits was by far the most important. Nothing would change the culture, the policies, more than replacing career politicians with citizen legislators. Political careerism more than anything else had separated Washington from the people. Careerism perpetuated big government and was a constant corrupting force in the system.”
—Oklahoma’s Sen. Dr. Tom Coburn in his book, Breach of Trust
stay well, your comments & suggestions are welcomed--greycloud
I enjoyed many parts of this, of course. But my favorite part has to be the quotation from "Dr. Tom Coburn." Dr. Tom and Dr. Angus are TIGHT, aaight?
Mr. Munger, Your comments and suggestions would be a great help. I have sent out hundreds of emails and wonder if I am beating a dead horse.
"One thing our founding fathers could not foresee…was a nation governed by professional politicians who had a vested interest in getting reelected. They probably envisioned a fellow serving a couple of hitches and then looking…forward to getting back to the farm.” —Ronald Reagan (1973)
WHY SHOULD YOU REGiSTER INDEPENDENT? short answer: because you can optimize your voting rights
Politicians now enjoy a lifetime job with regular raises and great benefits. The only way we can expect any changes in the economy is to un-elect them! Why not attack their biggest fears? All politicians fear 1. not being re-elected 2. term limits 3. tax revolts and 4. loss of power. The best way to break the Democratic (Dems) party and the Republican (Rep) party stranglehold is to register Independent (Indies). When you register Indie you do not need to change your political views, be they liberal or conservative. Being an Indie gives you more choices to vote for the most qualified person to handle the job. Why not vote for one Dem and one Rep Senator to balance out the Senate and level the playing field? Bi-partisan politics no longer works. It doesn't matter if the Dems have the majority or the Reps. The results are the same. Heads they win, tails we lose...
Ok, so what do we do after registering Indie? Write, call or email your Senators and Representives. Tell them you have registered Indie because you no longer trust the government machine. This may or may not "freak out" the politicians. Politicians keep a very close eye on the number of Dems, Reps or Indies in their district. If they see a huge number of NEW registered Indies, you can be sure we are weakening their stranglehold.
"Democracy is dead ... lobbyists rule America"---THIS IS A MUST READ, YOU WILL BE SHOCKED!
“Of all the reforms the freshmen wanted to bring to Washington, I believed setting term limits was by far the most important. Nothing would change the culture, the policies, more than replacing career politicians with citizen legislators. Political careerism more than anything else had separated Washington from the people. Careerism perpetuated big government and was a constant corrupting force in the system.”
—Oklahoma’s Sen. Dr. Tom Coburn in his book, Breach of Trust
stay well, your comments & suggestions are welcomed--greycloud
I enjoyed many parts of this, of course. But my favorite part has to be the quotation from "Dr. Tom Coburn." Dr. Tom and Dr. Angus are TIGHT, aaight?
Monday, December 01, 2008
The other shoe drops
"Chavez no ira!" which being translated is "Chavez will not go!", which is what Chavez his ownself told his supporters at recent rally in the capital:
"President Hugo Chavez asked supporters Sunday to petition for a constitutional amendment that would let him seek indefinite re-election and buy more time to build a socialist economy in Venezuela.
"President Hugo Chavez asked supporters Sunday to petition for a constitutional amendment that would let him seek indefinite re-election and buy more time to build a socialist economy in Venezuela.
Chavez, who was first elected in 1998, is barred from running again when his current term expires in 2013. He sought to abolish term limits last year, but Venezuelan voters rejected the bid, voting down a package of proposed constitutional changes.
"Last year, when we lost the referendum, I said I should accept the majority's decision," the former paratroop commander told a crowd of red-clad government supporters at a rally in Caracas. But now, he added, "I say you were right: Chavez will not go."
Any new attempt at a reform, which must be approved in a nationwide referendum, would open a new front for tensions between government-backers and their rivals — many of whom warn that Chavez wants to be president for life."
Wow a Latin American president trying to amend the constitution to stay in power, who could have seen that coming?
Tuesday, July 31, 2007
Caplanian testability?
Let me start with two confessions: (1) I like Bryan Caplan very much, (2) I have not read his book. However, I take the following as his central thesis:
“I see neither well-functioning democracies nor democracies hijacked by special interests,” Mr. Caplan writes. “Instead, I see democracies that fall short because voters get the foolish policies they ask for.”
and wish to speculate on how these three points of view might be discriminated between empirically.
My own work, mostly joint with Mungowitz, shows that interest groups systematically give money to legislators best positioned to support their causes, and that the amount an interest group can raise and spend depends on both the potential gains they may receive and the costs of overcoming free riding in their particular interest class. We also predict and find that the economic interests of voters serves to influence the price that specific legislators would have to charge to provide services to an interest group. So I guess we would say that interest groups get what they want subject to (a) their ability to organize, (b) the constraints that having to face voters in periodic elections puts on legislators, and (c) the institutional structure of the government (committee system, term limits, etc.).
I guess the biggest problem for me in the Caplan quote (sorry for going all Rand-ian on you guys) is defining terms. How do we know a well-functioning democracy when we see one? To me, if power changes hands peacefully and fraud is not rampant, then we pretty much have a well-functioning democracy. That is to say, I'd judge democracy on the process and not on the outcomes. I don't know of any proofs of propositions like "well functioning democracies produce efficient economic outcomes". In fact proofs of the opposite are somewhat prevalent, aren't they?
I also find it interesting that a lot of left leaning political scientists (and yes there ARE other kinds as well!!!) bemoan exactly the same alleged phenomenon claiming that poor and middle class people foolishly and repeatedly and mistakenly vote Republican against their own personal economic interests (right, Mungowitz?? Bartells and them guys).
Note that I personally am a very small government kind of guy. I'd like to cap spending at say 10% of GDP, virtually do away with our military, privatize social security, increase competition and ease entry into medicine, law, etc. I am just not sure how effective Bryan's argument is in reaching this kind of conclusion (which I freely acknowledge has probability zero of ever happening).
I guess I should actually say something about what this post is supposed to be about, the testability of Bryan's thesis, so here goes. I don't see any way to actually test between the three positions outlined in the original quote. Anyone?? Anyone?? Ferris??
“I see neither well-functioning democracies nor democracies hijacked by special interests,” Mr. Caplan writes. “Instead, I see democracies that fall short because voters get the foolish policies they ask for.”
and wish to speculate on how these three points of view might be discriminated between empirically.
My own work, mostly joint with Mungowitz, shows that interest groups systematically give money to legislators best positioned to support their causes, and that the amount an interest group can raise and spend depends on both the potential gains they may receive and the costs of overcoming free riding in their particular interest class. We also predict and find that the economic interests of voters serves to influence the price that specific legislators would have to charge to provide services to an interest group. So I guess we would say that interest groups get what they want subject to (a) their ability to organize, (b) the constraints that having to face voters in periodic elections puts on legislators, and (c) the institutional structure of the government (committee system, term limits, etc.).
I guess the biggest problem for me in the Caplan quote (sorry for going all Rand-ian on you guys) is defining terms. How do we know a well-functioning democracy when we see one? To me, if power changes hands peacefully and fraud is not rampant, then we pretty much have a well-functioning democracy. That is to say, I'd judge democracy on the process and not on the outcomes. I don't know of any proofs of propositions like "well functioning democracies produce efficient economic outcomes". In fact proofs of the opposite are somewhat prevalent, aren't they?
I also find it interesting that a lot of left leaning political scientists (and yes there ARE other kinds as well!!!) bemoan exactly the same alleged phenomenon claiming that poor and middle class people foolishly and repeatedly and mistakenly vote Republican against their own personal economic interests (right, Mungowitz?? Bartells and them guys).
Note that I personally am a very small government kind of guy. I'd like to cap spending at say 10% of GDP, virtually do away with our military, privatize social security, increase competition and ease entry into medicine, law, etc. I am just not sure how effective Bryan's argument is in reaching this kind of conclusion (which I freely acknowledge has probability zero of ever happening).
I guess I should actually say something about what this post is supposed to be about, the testability of Bryan's thesis, so here goes. I don't see any way to actually test between the three positions outlined in the original quote. Anyone?? Anyone?? Ferris??
Wednesday, December 02, 2009
Assessing the damage in Honduras
Greg Weeks, one of my two go to guys for Latin America, points to this generally good article in FP (yes I know I once called it the the "People Magazine of international affairs).
Even better, international favor could have been conditioned on an effort to rethink a surreal constitution that leaves the country vulnerable to future democratic breakdowns. Or perhaps a serious introspection among the Honduran elite about the introduction of social reforms of the sort that are desperately needed in a country afflicted by the pervasive poverty and obscene inequalities that make Zelaya-style populism an irresistible temptation.
He also points out that Zelaya was his own worst enemy throughout the whole affair:
To be sure, this is no vindication of Zelaya, an irresponsible politician who is as much a part and a product of the Honduran elite as anyone. The ousted president played his hand poorly: His unsurpassed ability to ramble confirmed all the prejudices about him, and his racking up miles in Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez's plane proved a dead-end route to regaining the presidency. Zelaya will go down in history as the single biggest culprit in his own coup. He was right about one thing (revising the Honduran constitution) but for the wrong reasons (he wanted to tamper with term limits and re-election clauses).
All in all a good piece, well worth reading. Honduras did not start down the road of Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ecuador this time, but the underlying conditions that made Chavez and his minions so popular among big segments of their country's populations still exist in Honduras.
Granted, this author also seems angry that the coup-makers "got what they wanted", but he does not urge non-recognition of the election results.
However, he does point out that the election even if universally recognized will not mean that the underlying problems in Honduras have gone away:
Even better, international favor could have been conditioned on an effort to rethink a surreal constitution that leaves the country vulnerable to future democratic breakdowns. Or perhaps a serious introspection among the Honduran elite about the introduction of social reforms of the sort that are desperately needed in a country afflicted by the pervasive poverty and obscene inequalities that make Zelaya-style populism an irresistible temptation.
He also points out that Zelaya was his own worst enemy throughout the whole affair:
To be sure, this is no vindication of Zelaya, an irresponsible politician who is as much a part and a product of the Honduran elite as anyone. The ousted president played his hand poorly: His unsurpassed ability to ramble confirmed all the prejudices about him, and his racking up miles in Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez's plane proved a dead-end route to regaining the presidency. Zelaya will go down in history as the single biggest culprit in his own coup. He was right about one thing (revising the Honduran constitution) but for the wrong reasons (he wanted to tamper with term limits and re-election clauses).
All in all a good piece, well worth reading. Honduras did not start down the road of Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ecuador this time, but the underlying conditions that made Chavez and his minions so popular among big segments of their country's populations still exist in Honduras.
Saturday, April 10, 2010
Law Review
Kevin L sends this syllabus for you law clones out there. Get reading! And, goodONya, K-Rad!
Legal Constraints on Supreme Court Decision Making: Do Jurisprudential
Regimes Exist?
Jeffrey Lax & Kelly Rader
Journal of Politics, April 2010, Pages 273-284
Abstract: The founding debate of judicial politics - is Supreme Court decision making driven by law or politics? - remains at center stage. One influential line of attack involves the identification of jurisprudential regimes, stable patterns of case decisions based on the influence of case factors. The key test is whether the regime changes after a major precedent-setting decision, that is, whether the case factors are subsequently treated differently by the Supreme Court justices themselves so that they vote as though constrained by precedent. We analyze whether binding jurisprudential regime change actually exists. The standard test assumes votes are independent observations, even though they are clustered by case and by term. We argue that a (nonparametric) “randomization test” is more appropriate. We find little evidence that precedents affect voting.
__________________________________
Solicitor General Influence and Agenda Setting on the United States Supreme
Court
Ryan Black & Ryan Owens, Harvard Working Paper, March 2010
Abstract: Do Solicitors General influence Supreme Court justices to behave differently than they would like? If so, are there limits on such influence? Using archival data, we find strong evidence of Solicitor General influence. In a substantial number of cases at the Supreme Court's agenda-setting stage, justices follow Solicitor General recommendations even when they are completely opposed to them. At the same time, we observe that law exerts strong influence. Justices are significantly less likely to follow Solicitor General recommendations that contravene important legal factors.
------------------------
Friends of the Circuits: Interest Group Influence on Decision Making in the
U.S. Courts of Appeals
Paul Collins & Wendy Martinek, Social Science Quarterly, June 2010, Pages 397-414
Objective: Though there is an extensive literature focused on the participation and efficacy of interest group amici curiae in the U.S. Supreme Court, there is little rigorous analysis of amici curiae in the U.S. Courts of Appeals. Here, we systematically analyze the influence of amicus curiae briefs on U.S. Court of Appeals decision making to provide insights regarding both judicial decision making and the efficacy of interest groups.
Methods: We use a probit model to capture influences on appellant success in the courts of appeals from 1997-2002.
Results: We find that amicus briefs filed in support of the appellant enhance the likelihood of that litigant's probability of success, but that amicus briefs filed in support of the appellee have no effect on litigation outcomes.
Conclusion: Amici can help level the playing field between appellants and appellees by serving to counter the propensity to affirm in the U.S. Courts of Appeals.
------------------------
Congressional Constraints and Tactical Supreme Court Maneuvers: Calling for
the Views of the United States Solicitor General
Ryan Black & Ryan Owens
Harvard Working Paper, January 2010
Abstract: Do United States Supreme Court justices invoke the aid of executive branch
officials to help them overcome congressional constraints? We examine archival data collected from the private papers of former Justice Harry A. Blackmun to analyze the conditions under which Supreme Court justices force the Solicitor General to participate in cases. We find that in addition to legal considerations, justices invite the SG to participate in cases so as to gain information that will aid them in determining whether the president will use his veto to protect the Court's decision against congressional override attempts. Justices are between 44% and 56% more likely to invite the SG when they require the president's veto to protect their decisions. These results hold across a host of alternative models of legislative
decision making and other various modeling specifications.
------------------------
In Search of Judicial Activism in the Same-Sex Marriage Cases: Sorting the
Evidence from Courts, Legislatures, Initiatives and Amendments
Scott Barclay, Perspectives on Politics, March 2010, Pages 111-126
Abstract: In 2006, President Bush publicly stated that, in relation to the same-sex
marriage issue, “activist judges” were thwarting the preferred policy of the elected representatives and the expression of popular will embodied in popular initiatives and constitutional amendments. Notwithstanding the philosophical discussion of the constitutionally assigned role of courts in the political system and the idea of judicial independence, President Bush's statement raises an interesting empirical question: In the case of same-sex marriage, have state and federal courts really acted in direct opposition to the expressed policy preferences of current or recent legislative majorities or overturned popular initiatives and constitutional amendments? Using evidence from state and federal legislative and judicial action around same-sex marriage primarily from the fifteen years preceding President
Bush's 2006 statement, I argue that, with some rare exceptions, judges can not easily be identified as “activist” on the issue of same-sex marriage even if we assess their actions according to President Bush's criteria.
------------------------
A Theory of Loopholes
Leo Katz
Journal of Legal Studies, January 2010, Pages 1-31
Abstract:
Laws are known to be replete with loopholes. The reason is generally thought to lie in the divergence between the text and the purpose of a law. Practical constraints supposedly make laws unavoidably over‐ or underinclusive. Lawyers who exploit loopholes are thought to be taking advantage of that over‐ and underinclusiveness. This essay offers a different perspective. Most loopholes have nothing to do with the over‐ or underinclusiveness of rules. This is best seen by exploring a particular subset of rules that reveal most clearly what is going on: the rules of voting. Arrow’s famous theorem teaches us that all halfway decent voting rules are vulnerable to agenda manipulation. Fundamentally, it will turn out, all legal rules are analogous to voting rules and all loophole exploitation analogous to agenda manipulation. The loophole‐exploiting lawyer no more deserves to be criticized, sanctioned, or otherwise frustrated in his efforts than does the shrewd parliamentarian.
------------------------
The Separation of Powers and Supreme Court Agenda Setting
Ryan Owens, Harvard Working Paper, September 2009
Abstract:
This study employs the first systematic, empirical analysis that relies on archival data to examine whether the separation of powers influences justices' agenda votes. It spatially models how justices set the Court's agenda under a sincere approach as well as an SOP approach and compares the competing expectations derived therefrom. The results suggest that legislative and executive preferences fail to influence justices' votes. Across every model tested, the data show justices uninfluenced by the separation of powers. These results provide a strong rejoinder to SOP models, since the Court's agenda stage is the most likely stage of the decision making process to show signs of an SOP effect.
Legal Constraints on Supreme Court Decision Making: Do Jurisprudential
Regimes Exist?
Jeffrey Lax & Kelly Rader
Journal of Politics, April 2010, Pages 273-284
Abstract: The founding debate of judicial politics - is Supreme Court decision making driven by law or politics? - remains at center stage. One influential line of attack involves the identification of jurisprudential regimes, stable patterns of case decisions based on the influence of case factors. The key test is whether the regime changes after a major precedent-setting decision, that is, whether the case factors are subsequently treated differently by the Supreme Court justices themselves so that they vote as though constrained by precedent. We analyze whether binding jurisprudential regime change actually exists. The standard test assumes votes are independent observations, even though they are clustered by case and by term. We argue that a (nonparametric) “randomization test” is more appropriate. We find little evidence that precedents affect voting.
__________________________________
Solicitor General Influence and Agenda Setting on the United States Supreme
Court
Ryan Black & Ryan Owens, Harvard Working Paper, March 2010
Abstract: Do Solicitors General influence Supreme Court justices to behave differently than they would like? If so, are there limits on such influence? Using archival data, we find strong evidence of Solicitor General influence. In a substantial number of cases at the Supreme Court's agenda-setting stage, justices follow Solicitor General recommendations even when they are completely opposed to them. At the same time, we observe that law exerts strong influence. Justices are significantly less likely to follow Solicitor General recommendations that contravene important legal factors.
------------------------
Friends of the Circuits: Interest Group Influence on Decision Making in the
U.S. Courts of Appeals
Paul Collins & Wendy Martinek, Social Science Quarterly, June 2010, Pages 397-414
Objective: Though there is an extensive literature focused on the participation and efficacy of interest group amici curiae in the U.S. Supreme Court, there is little rigorous analysis of amici curiae in the U.S. Courts of Appeals. Here, we systematically analyze the influence of amicus curiae briefs on U.S. Court of Appeals decision making to provide insights regarding both judicial decision making and the efficacy of interest groups.
Methods: We use a probit model to capture influences on appellant success in the courts of appeals from 1997-2002.
Results: We find that amicus briefs filed in support of the appellant enhance the likelihood of that litigant's probability of success, but that amicus briefs filed in support of the appellee have no effect on litigation outcomes.
Conclusion: Amici can help level the playing field between appellants and appellees by serving to counter the propensity to affirm in the U.S. Courts of Appeals.
------------------------
Congressional Constraints and Tactical Supreme Court Maneuvers: Calling for
the Views of the United States Solicitor General
Ryan Black & Ryan Owens
Harvard Working Paper, January 2010
Abstract: Do United States Supreme Court justices invoke the aid of executive branch
officials to help them overcome congressional constraints? We examine archival data collected from the private papers of former Justice Harry A. Blackmun to analyze the conditions under which Supreme Court justices force the Solicitor General to participate in cases. We find that in addition to legal considerations, justices invite the SG to participate in cases so as to gain information that will aid them in determining whether the president will use his veto to protect the Court's decision against congressional override attempts. Justices are between 44% and 56% more likely to invite the SG when they require the president's veto to protect their decisions. These results hold across a host of alternative models of legislative
decision making and other various modeling specifications.
------------------------
In Search of Judicial Activism in the Same-Sex Marriage Cases: Sorting the
Evidence from Courts, Legislatures, Initiatives and Amendments
Scott Barclay, Perspectives on Politics, March 2010, Pages 111-126
Abstract: In 2006, President Bush publicly stated that, in relation to the same-sex
marriage issue, “activist judges” were thwarting the preferred policy of the elected representatives and the expression of popular will embodied in popular initiatives and constitutional amendments. Notwithstanding the philosophical discussion of the constitutionally assigned role of courts in the political system and the idea of judicial independence, President Bush's statement raises an interesting empirical question: In the case of same-sex marriage, have state and federal courts really acted in direct opposition to the expressed policy preferences of current or recent legislative majorities or overturned popular initiatives and constitutional amendments? Using evidence from state and federal legislative and judicial action around same-sex marriage primarily from the fifteen years preceding President
Bush's 2006 statement, I argue that, with some rare exceptions, judges can not easily be identified as “activist” on the issue of same-sex marriage even if we assess their actions according to President Bush's criteria.
------------------------
A Theory of Loopholes
Leo Katz
Journal of Legal Studies, January 2010, Pages 1-31
Abstract:
Laws are known to be replete with loopholes. The reason is generally thought to lie in the divergence between the text and the purpose of a law. Practical constraints supposedly make laws unavoidably over‐ or underinclusive. Lawyers who exploit loopholes are thought to be taking advantage of that over‐ and underinclusiveness. This essay offers a different perspective. Most loopholes have nothing to do with the over‐ or underinclusiveness of rules. This is best seen by exploring a particular subset of rules that reveal most clearly what is going on: the rules of voting. Arrow’s famous theorem teaches us that all halfway decent voting rules are vulnerable to agenda manipulation. Fundamentally, it will turn out, all legal rules are analogous to voting rules and all loophole exploitation analogous to agenda manipulation. The loophole‐exploiting lawyer no more deserves to be criticized, sanctioned, or otherwise frustrated in his efforts than does the shrewd parliamentarian.
------------------------
The Separation of Powers and Supreme Court Agenda Setting
Ryan Owens, Harvard Working Paper, September 2009
Abstract:
This study employs the first systematic, empirical analysis that relies on archival data to examine whether the separation of powers influences justices' agenda votes. It spatially models how justices set the Court's agenda under a sincere approach as well as an SOP approach and compares the competing expectations derived therefrom. The results suggest that legislative and executive preferences fail to influence justices' votes. Across every model tested, the data show justices uninfluenced by the separation of powers. These results provide a strong rejoinder to SOP models, since the Court's agenda stage is the most likely stage of the decision making process to show signs of an SOP effect.
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