Not sure how to take this.
Lou Dobbs likes "Indoctrinate U"
In fact, Lou says so.
I do have some small part in this movie. Have achieved minor cult status, as the review of a showing at the Kennedy Center reveals:
The left-wing “academics” portrayed in "Indoctrinate U" have an almost comic-book-like rigidity, and yet they take themselves with the utmost seriousness.
The absurdity of campus life was summed up by conservative professor Michael Munger in a line that had the entire Kennedy Center audience hooting and cheering.
After describing how most university classes — whether it be English, science, or government — tend to begin with a long political harangue by the teachers to condemn the war in Iraq or ridicule George W. Bush, he concluded, “What most faculty want is for students to validate their pathetic life experiences.”
Thursday, March 12, 2009
Let natural selection work
Don't do things like this.
Local resident Phil Richmond, who witnessed the rescue, told The Toronto Star that the man clearly didn't want to be saved.
"A man has survived despite plunging 180ft (55m) over Niagara Falls and spending 45 minutes in freezing waters resisting his rescuers.
The unnamed man was seen by tourists to scale a wall and leap into the rapids above the falls.
Shortly afterwards he was spotted in the water near the base of the falls clinging to a log.....
A specially trained falls rescue team had rushed to the man's aid after receiving reports of him going over the Horseshoe Falls, one of Niagara's three waterfalls.
However, the man - who was naked - swam away from them toward the middle of the river, police said.
A private helicopter was called in and used the force of its rotor blades to blow him closer to shore.
Firefighter Todd Brunning and another rescue worker then swam about 60 yards, grabbed the man and pulled him to safety, officials said.....
Local resident Phil Richmond, who witnessed the rescue, told The Toronto Star that the man clearly didn't want to be saved.
"It appeared he didn't want to come into shore. I thought he was an idiot to be honest with you," he said. "
My favorite part has to be the helicopter turning itself sideways and blowing the guy towards shore as he (apparently) tries to swim away from shore.
Quote of the Day
"Fixing one problem at a time may strike Obama as mere gum-chewing. But in modern-day Washington, one is a very high number. The reason so many people were left slack-jawed by the Obama budget was not that they disagreed with his premise that health-care costs are out of control or that energy independence is desirable or that better schools are important to the future of the economy. It was the real-world knowledge that financial calamity has not magically transformed our slow-moving, reform- resistant, cantankerous government into a peaceful, streamlined, problem-tackling machine."
From here, well worth reading the whole thing.
From here, well worth reading the whole thing.
Good News!
People, James. F. Jarmusch has a new movie coming out called "The limits of control". Jarmusch, along with Hal Hartley, Alejandro González Iñárritu and Wong Kar Wai make up the indie director pantheon at Chez Angus. Cast includes Gael Garcia Bernal, Tilda Swinton, and Bill Murray. Here are a couple links (link1, link 2).
I will probably have to drive to Dallas to see this movie when it's released, but that's ok with me!
I will probably have to drive to Dallas to see this movie when it's released, but that's ok with me!
Some Credit Crisis Conjectures
From Douglas Diamond and Raghuram G. Rajan in their recent NBER working paper (ungated version here). I have been suffering from crisis overload and not posting much about it lately, but this piece is an extremely readable, clear, non-technical and interesting overview of the underlying causes of the crisis and it also contains some interesting ideas about why we continue to have a credit crunch and what the government can do about it.
They address one element of the crisis that I have found very weird. Securitization is a way to package up and sell off risk. Yet tons of banks (originators) held on to mortgage backed securities. Here's their take:
Given that originators would have understood the deterioration of the underlying quality of mortgages, it is surprising that they held on to so many of the mortgage-backed securities (MBS)in their own portfolios. These were not just the low-rated equity portions that would have signaled their faith in the packages, but also the high-rated tranches that found a ready market
around the world. The amounts of MBS held seemed too high to be purely inventory. Some holdings could have been portions of the package they could not sell, but then this would not explain why banks held on to AAA-rated securities, which seemed to be the most highly demanded of mortgage
backed securities. The real answer seems to be that bankers thought these securities were worthwhile investments, despite their risk. Investment in MBS seemed to be part of a culture of excessive risk taking that had overtaken banks (see Raghuram G. Rajan, 2005; and Anil K. Kashyap, Raghuram G. Rajan, and Jeremy C. Stein, 2008). A key factor contributing to this culture is that, over short periods of time, it is very hard, especially in the case of new products, to tell whether a financial manager is generating true excess returns adjusting for risk, or whether the current returns are simply compensation for a
risk that has not yet shown itself but that will eventually materialize.
They address one element of the crisis that I have found very weird. Securitization is a way to package up and sell off risk. Yet tons of banks (originators) held on to mortgage backed securities. Here's their take:
Given that originators would have understood the deterioration of the underlying quality of mortgages, it is surprising that they held on to so many of the mortgage-backed securities (MBS)in their own portfolios. These were not just the low-rated equity portions that would have signaled their faith in the packages, but also the high-rated tranches that found a ready market
around the world. The amounts of MBS held seemed too high to be purely inventory. Some holdings could have been portions of the package they could not sell, but then this would not explain why banks held on to AAA-rated securities, which seemed to be the most highly demanded of mortgage
backed securities. The real answer seems to be that bankers thought these securities were worthwhile investments, despite their risk. Investment in MBS seemed to be part of a culture of excessive risk taking that had overtaken banks (see Raghuram G. Rajan, 2005; and Anil K. Kashyap, Raghuram G. Rajan, and Jeremy C. Stein, 2008). A key factor contributing to this culture is that, over short periods of time, it is very hard, especially in the case of new products, to tell whether a financial manager is generating true excess returns adjusting for risk, or whether the current returns are simply compensation for a
risk that has not yet shown itself but that will eventually materialize.
Wednesday, March 11, 2009
My Dinner With Rush
Okay, it wasn't dinner, it was a 45 minute phone interview.
But....I really did get to talk to himself today, for 45 minutes. The results, or some of the results, will come out in the Limbaugh Letter.
And, I have to admit, he is a terrific interviewer. Really, really prepared, interested in the response, happy with long answers. I realize it would be different if I were a guest on the radio show. But he doesn't DO guests on the radio show, because he doesn't need to. He can do it himself, regardless of whether you might agree with the content.
The point is, it was not a Chris Matthews style interview, where the guest is really just a mute prop. We talked about a lot of stuff. Rush appeared particularly interested in how American history is taught, and what is going to happen in Cuba.
A blast, in other words. Regardless of whether anything gets used (and that is entirely up to the EIB; that is an entertainment business, first and foremost), it was quite an experience, talking to the man that the Obama administration considers to be the intellectual leader of the conservative movement.
But....I really did get to talk to himself today, for 45 minutes. The results, or some of the results, will come out in the Limbaugh Letter.
And, I have to admit, he is a terrific interviewer. Really, really prepared, interested in the response, happy with long answers. I realize it would be different if I were a guest on the radio show. But he doesn't DO guests on the radio show, because he doesn't need to. He can do it himself, regardless of whether you might agree with the content.
The point is, it was not a Chris Matthews style interview, where the guest is really just a mute prop. We talked about a lot of stuff. Rush appeared particularly interested in how American history is taught, and what is going to happen in Cuba.
A blast, in other words. Regardless of whether anything gets used (and that is entirely up to the EIB; that is an entertainment business, first and foremost), it was quite an experience, talking to the man that the Obama administration considers to be the intellectual leader of the conservative movement.
Right to Work and Unemployment
The January state level unemployment figures came out today. The rates range from 3.7% in Wyoming to 11.6% in Michigan.
Over at Carpe Diem, my friend Mark Perry correctly points out that the 8 states with the lowest unemployment rates are all "right to work" states.
But that's not really the whole story. There are data for 50 states plus DC and there are 22 right to work states. We'd want, at a minimum to know, if right to work states have significantly lower unemployment rates than the others.
A couple minutes of slaving over EVIEWS produced the following simple regression
State Unemployment = 7.631 - 0.990*Right to work State
While this says that right to work states have about 1% point less unemployment on average, the t-statistic testing the null hypothesis that the coefficient on the right to work state variable is actually zero is computed to be -1.935. Thus we cannot reject that there is no difference between right to work and non right to work states at the traditional 5% significance level (though we could at the 10% significance level). If we adjust the standard errors for heteroskedasticity the t-statistic falls to -1.87 but the inference remains the same.
If we add an additional dummy variable for the 4 states hit hardest by the foreclosure crisis (California, Arizona, Nevada, and Florida (three of which are right to work states)) we get this:
State Unemployment = 7.47 - 1.183*Right to work State + 1.557*Foreclosure crisis State
In this case both the right to work coefficient and the foreclosure crisis coefficient are significantly different from zero at the 5% level.
So at the simple level of differences between means, there is no significant difference in current unemployment rates between right to work and non right to work states. Multiple regression may reveal a different picture. Of course in all these cases, without a theoretical model behind it, the results are only correlations and can't really be taken as anything causal.
Over at Carpe Diem, my friend Mark Perry correctly points out that the 8 states with the lowest unemployment rates are all "right to work" states.
But that's not really the whole story. There are data for 50 states plus DC and there are 22 right to work states. We'd want, at a minimum to know, if right to work states have significantly lower unemployment rates than the others.
A couple minutes of slaving over EVIEWS produced the following simple regression
State Unemployment = 7.631 - 0.990*Right to work State
While this says that right to work states have about 1% point less unemployment on average, the t-statistic testing the null hypothesis that the coefficient on the right to work state variable is actually zero is computed to be -1.935. Thus we cannot reject that there is no difference between right to work and non right to work states at the traditional 5% significance level (though we could at the 10% significance level). If we adjust the standard errors for heteroskedasticity the t-statistic falls to -1.87 but the inference remains the same.
If we add an additional dummy variable for the 4 states hit hardest by the foreclosure crisis (California, Arizona, Nevada, and Florida (three of which are right to work states)) we get this:
State Unemployment = 7.47 - 1.183*Right to work State + 1.557*Foreclosure crisis State
In this case both the right to work coefficient and the foreclosure crisis coefficient are significantly different from zero at the 5% level.
So at the simple level of differences between means, there is no significant difference in current unemployment rates between right to work and non right to work states. Multiple regression may reveal a different picture. Of course in all these cases, without a theoretical model behind it, the results are only correlations and can't really be taken as anything causal.
Rockin' Like a Hurricane
Tonight....tonight......I'll watch hockEEEE tonight.
'Canes have actually pulled their sorry butts back into contention for an NHL playoff spot. If you want to argue that this is only because the Panthers, Rangers, and Sabres suck so bad, I won't disagree, but still.
I've had a hard few years. 'Canes won Lord Stanley's giant protective Cup in 2006, which was pretty fun. Hockey season lasted well into June here in Carolina.
Then, the last two years, hockey season ended in April, when the 'Canes didn't even make the playoffs. Last year, they had to take what looked like a Shaq on His Back Intentional Dive Attack to avoid the playoffs. They were four points ahead of the Washington Capitals with four games left in April 2008, but failed to hold the lead. Now THAT is sucking.
'Canes play the Blackhawks (36-19-9) tonight. They are playing in Atlanta (Make that CHICAGO; thanks DD, in comments!). The Blackhawks are quite good. We need to win this, but it will be tough....
And, with the help of "Anna Banana," we just might!
'Canes have actually pulled their sorry butts back into contention for an NHL playoff spot. If you want to argue that this is only because the Panthers, Rangers, and Sabres suck so bad, I won't disagree, but still.
I've had a hard few years. 'Canes won Lord Stanley's giant protective Cup in 2006, which was pretty fun. Hockey season lasted well into June here in Carolina.
Then, the last two years, hockey season ended in April, when the 'Canes didn't even make the playoffs. Last year, they had to take what looked like a Shaq on His Back Intentional Dive Attack to avoid the playoffs. They were four points ahead of the Washington Capitals with four games left in April 2008, but failed to hold the lead. Now THAT is sucking.
'Canes play the Blackhawks (36-19-9) tonight. They are playing in Atlanta (Make that CHICAGO; thanks DD, in comments!). The Blackhawks are quite good. We need to win this, but it will be tough....
And, with the help of "Anna Banana," we just might!
Sympathy From the Devil
"Influenced by Adam Smith, Darwin believed that a sense of sympathy is essential for the existence of a workable society. That accounts for having a concern for the welfare of others, but not for why one organism within a society will come to the aid of another when to do so is risky or expensive. There are various possible ways of explaining such behavior, some of which Darwin considered...he invoked group selection, with the tribe the unit that gets selected. This may seem odd at first, but consider Darwin's experience during the Beagle voyage. He repeatedly saw evidence of one tribe exterminating another, and found native peoples in decline when thrown into competition with the more economically advanced." [Ghiselin, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, forthcoming]
"We suggest that in fact social Darwinists came to regard sympathy, the social glue of small groups, as an impediment to racial perfection because it allowed the 'unfit' to survive...The loss of sympathy is tied up with the question of how ideas of race entered into 19th century economics. A critical step occurred when Darwin's Descent of Man proposed that concern for the 'greatest happiness' be replaced with concern for the 'greatest good,' which is defined as racial perfection effected through 'natural selection'...The question is how did economics move from universalism to a form of particularism? Our answer is that The Economist served as a network for late 19th century racial theorizing in British economics...When Spencer's reciprocity norm was replaced by 'natural selection' in which the killer has higher rank than the killed, economics changed. We have conjectured (Peart and Levy 2005) that the coming of 'natural selection' into economics meant the end of sympathy as an analytical construction. Sympathy was an impediment to the law of the strong." [Levy & Peart, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, forthcoming]
(Nod to Kevin L)
"We suggest that in fact social Darwinists came to regard sympathy, the social glue of small groups, as an impediment to racial perfection because it allowed the 'unfit' to survive...The loss of sympathy is tied up with the question of how ideas of race entered into 19th century economics. A critical step occurred when Darwin's Descent of Man proposed that concern for the 'greatest happiness' be replaced with concern for the 'greatest good,' which is defined as racial perfection effected through 'natural selection'...The question is how did economics move from universalism to a form of particularism? Our answer is that The Economist served as a network for late 19th century racial theorizing in British economics...When Spencer's reciprocity norm was replaced by 'natural selection' in which the killer has higher rank than the killed, economics changed. We have conjectured (Peart and Levy 2005) that the coming of 'natural selection' into economics meant the end of sympathy as an analytical construction. Sympathy was an impediment to the law of the strong." [Levy & Peart, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, forthcoming]
(Nod to Kevin L)
Greenie: "IT WASN'T ME!!!"
In today's WSJ, Alan Greenspan says blame the Chinese, not him, for the low interest rates that fueled the housing bubble. Yes the Fed funds rate was low and far lower than the Taylor rule would have set it, but mortgage rates and monetary policy had become "decoupled". Mortgage rates were not low because of easy monetary policy, they were low because of the Chinese savings glut!
People, I am not making this up. You can read it from the great equivocator's own word processor right here.
He basically says that even if the Fed had tried to tighten policy it wouldn't have affected any investment relevant interest rate. Hmmmm, so Alan, should we just get rid of the Fed then??
This is a new low, even for Greenspan. Yes, he says, monetary policy was too loose by any traditional standard but it didn't have anything to do with the bubble because monetary policy also happened to be completely irrelevant at the time. The former "second most powerful person in the world" now is claiming that he was actually powerless.
People, I am not making this up. You can read it from the great equivocator's own word processor right here.
He basically says that even if the Fed had tried to tighten policy it wouldn't have affected any investment relevant interest rate. Hmmmm, so Alan, should we just get rid of the Fed then??
This is a new low, even for Greenspan. Yes, he says, monetary policy was too loose by any traditional standard but it didn't have anything to do with the bubble because monetary policy also happened to be completely irrelevant at the time. The former "second most powerful person in the world" now is claiming that he was actually powerless.
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