Thursday, November 26, 2015

Menu, Chez Mungowitz

For T-day, we had:

  • Butterflied turkey, with salt-rub/air dry for 5 days.  Roasted on rack.
  • Roasted root vegetable (taro, sweet taters, rutabaga, parsnips, onions, jicama, carrots), from roasting pan placed below turkey on rack.
  • Smashed white taters, skins on
  • Smashed carrots and turnips, mushed together
  • Smashed squash (butternut and acorn), mushed together
  • Peas
  • Gravy made from turkey/giblets stock
  • Persimmon chutney (very spicy!)
  • Cranberry sauce (fresh cranberries, fresh apple cider, and raisins, no added sugar, very tart!)
  • Traditional dressing (cornbread crushed up, sage sausage, onions, celery, lots of extra sage)
  • Nontraditional dressing (cornbread crushed up, oysters, dates, onions, cayenne pepper, slivered almonds)
  • Dinner rolls
And dessert:
  • Apple pie
  • Pecan pie
  • Pumpkin pie

The guy on the left

Happy Thanksgiving from KPC!

and a theory on the origin of the American "left"

Tuesday, November 24, 2015

Burt Helm's article on AirBnB

Did an interview with Burt Helm, of INC, on AirBnB

The link is here....

He raises some interesting questions.

Airbnb, a startup which is still not yet eight years old, continues to face many of the same challenges it faced last year: It's trying to retain a folksy, community-driven image even as it surpasses multinational hospitality chains in size. It faces public relations crises when bad things happen in Airbnb homes--most recently, a death in Texas and report of a rape in Spain. And it still runs afoul of local governments who say the company's listings are unlawful.

Monday, November 23, 2015

Optimal Fraud, and Efficiency Fraud

"Deliver the Vote! Micromotives and Macrobehavior in Electoral Fraud"

Ashlea Rundlett & Milan Svolik
American Political Science Review, forthcoming

Abstract: Most election fraud is not conducted centrally by incumbents but rather locally by a machinery consisting of a multitude of political operatives. How does an incumbent ensure that his agents deliver fraud when needed and as much as is needed? We address this and related puzzles in the political organization of election fraud by studying the perverse consequences of two distinct incentive conflicts: the principal-agent problem between an incumbent and his local agents, and the collective action problem among the agents. Using the global game methodology, we show that these incentive conflicts result in a herd dynamic among the agents that tends to either oversupply or undersupply fraud, rarely delivering the amount of fraud that would be optimal from the incumbent's point of view. This equilibrium dynamic explains when and why electoral fraud fails to deliver incumbent victories, why incumbents who enjoy genuine popularity often engage in seemingly unnecessary fraud, and it predicts that the extent of fraud should be increasing in both the incumbent's genuine support and reported results across precincts. A statistical analysis of anomalies in precinct-level results from the 2011-12 Russian legislative and presidential elections supports our key claims.

Nod to Kevin Lewis


@econtalker was kind enough to include me (much more than I deserved) in the 500th episode of "Econ Talk."

The link is here.

Got to tell the Unicorn story, which is also a centerpiece of The Thing Itself.

Thanks so much to Russ Roberts, for having created a new thing in the world.

 For many thousands of people, Mondays are now a good day.