Management would generally prefer to be insulated from an outside takeover. Because then you can suck, and take lots of profits in the form of inefficiency and perks, and be sheltered from those scolding winds of M&A hammers.
Since the SEC largely works for existing corporations, and has little interest in promoting competition,* they are considering adopting a rule that would make poison pills more deadly. Ick.
(*After all, the SEC is a lap dog for powerful congressmen who depend on contributions from rent-seekers; you can't get contributions from companies that don't exist, even if those companies would have been larger, healthier, and more productive)
Since the SEC largely works for existing corporations, and has little interest in promoting competition,* they are considering adopting a rule that would make poison pills more deadly. Ick.
(*After all, the SEC is a lap dog for powerful congressmen who depend on contributions from rent-seekers; you can't get contributions from companies that don't exist, even if those companies would have been larger, healthier, and more productive)
1 comment:
Apart from some remarkable literary flourishes and mixed metaphors (scolding wind of hammers?) you've got a fine point here. But why should any company EVER have a poison pill when the owners (as represented by the board) get to decide whether to sell? This problem is far worse than a regulatory one; it goes to the primary flaw in corporate governance in America.
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