KPC friend Amar Bhide has an interesting piece in Barrons.
In an email, Amar writes:
This is a general problem. Well-intentioned securities laws work only too well, turning judgment and relationship based finance into anonymous, arm’s length transactions. This also discriminates against financings that can’t be easily securitized; thus we get lots of mortgaged backed securities, fewer small business loans.
Tell that to the next person who tries to say that "lack of regulation" caused the financial crisis. It's not true. STUPID regulation caused the financial crisis, and Dodd-Frank is even more stupid than what we had in 2007.
Excerpt from the article, since it's gated:
In an email, Amar writes:
This is a general problem. Well-intentioned securities laws work only too well, turning judgment and relationship based finance into anonymous, arm’s length transactions. This also discriminates against financings that can’t be easily securitized; thus we get lots of mortgaged backed securities, fewer small business loans.
Tell that to the next person who tries to say that "lack of regulation" caused the financial crisis. It's not true. STUPID regulation caused the financial crisis, and Dodd-Frank is even more stupid than what we had in 2007.
Excerpt from the article, since it's gated:
When little else was regulated in
the 19th and early 20th centuries, lawmakers kept banks on a tight leash. Even
so, we didn't get all the pieces of bank regulation right until the 1930s. In
contrast, the securities markets functioned adequately under the private rules
of the stock exchanges.
We can argue about what kind of
regulatory model is best—whether or not deposit insurance should be capped, for
instance. But skin-in-the-game rules that require banks to take on more risk
are perverse.
Banks were vulnerable to the
collapse of the housing and mortgage-backed securities markets in many ways.
They had financed the inventory of mortgages that had not yet been turned into
securities and invested heavily in the securities themselves. Providers of
wholesale short-term funds shunned mega-banks exposed to derivatives based on
mortgage-backed securities.
These problems arose from risks that
banks had taken on, not ones they had palmed off to investors.
The seemingly arcane 5% rule also
raises another basic public-policy issue: Why single out investors in
mortgage-backed securities for protection? Bonds issued by rock-solid companies
can also become nearly worthless. Think of the formerly rock-solid General
Motors and American Airlines. Stocks of high- or low-tech companies often
crater.
According
to Barney Frank's reasoning, forcing underwriters to retain some of the risk
should improve the quality of corporate securities as well. Yet, with uncommon
good sense, Congress hasn't imposed such a requirement.
MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES should be less deserving of lawmakers' solicitude.
Corporate bonds first were widely issued in the 19th century by railroads that
had to raise more funds than a single lender could advance. Utilities and
industrial companies with similarly large capital requirements followed. But
even a small community bank can make and hold mortgages; securitization isn't
compelled by the scale of the activity financed. The economic advantages of
securitization supposedly derive from efficiencies in the financing process, in
the mass-production and mass-marketing of credit.
Mass production in turn entails the
use of backward-looking statistical models that pay no heed to the specific
circumstances of the borrower. This virtually ensures bad credit decisions in a
dynamic economy in which the demand for loans starts with the forward-looking
judgments of aspiring borrowers.
Traditional corporate bonds aren't
meant to be mass-produced, although they may be mass-marketed to public
investors. Good underwriting requires careful forward-looking assessments of
each issuer's prospects.
The
securitization of mass-produced mortgage credit surged before the 2008 crash
because public policies and officials inflated what would otherwise have been a
fringe activity.
Banks have had to set aside less
capital against investments in securitized mortgages than they do for their
direct holdings of mortgage loans. This has encouraged banks to try to raise
their return on equity by replacing loans with securities.
Banks
and other investors in mortgage securities could also eliminate the costs of
monitoring borrowers, relying instead on the ratings provided by SEC-certified
agencies.
Public
officials averred that securities comprising geographically diversified
mortgages were perfectly safe. And not long before the housing bubble burst,
Ben Bernanke said that a nationwide decline in home prices was unlikely.
Most
mortgages have been securitized by government-sponsored entities, virtually
guaranteeing investors a free lunch: higher interest than paid by Treasury
bonds but with practically no more risk.
Guaranteeing housing debt was
instrumental in discouraging careful lending. It drew credit away from more
worthwhile borrowers and activities, even before the crash.
The
housing and securitized-mortgage markets remain weak. Instead of trying to pump
them back up, lawmakers and regulators must focus relentlessly on recreating a
banking system that lends prudently and evenhandedly to all creditworthy
businesses and individuals.
1 comment:
The regulation of banks in the 19th and early 20th century was done by the states. The repeated financial crisis that occurred in the period was the reason the Federal Reserve Act was written in 1913. Decentralized regulation did not work well at all actually. Banks may have had regulation on the books in the states; however, the actual supervision and regulation by the states was very slack and corruption was pervasive. Mike, do really believe that the last crisis would have occurred without the repeal of Glass-Steagall and the commodity futures modernization act?
Jay
Post a Comment